Abstract
Introduction
Computer networks are vulnemle. Suppose that donica sends an e-mail to her friend Bill. Since her message must pass through other computers, other people can read or alter it (Fig. 1) . They can send bogus messages that appear to come from Bill.
Cryptography can help, if it is used correctly. Monica and Bill can run a security protocol: a previously agreed message handshake. Figure 2 presents SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), which is used in Web servers. In the first two messages, Monica and Bill contact each other. Then, using public-key cryptography, they generate temporary encryption keys. Eventually they have their electronic conversation, using the new keys for encryption. Nobody can listen An SSL handshake consists of up to eight messages and relies on several different cryptographic primitives. There are good reasons for this complexity. The protocol must thwart all known forms of attack, such as somebody's sending messages built from parts of messages she has intercepted. The protocol also tries to minimize the use of slow public-key operations.
Security protocols often contain serious errors. Formal verification can find errors and can increase our understanding of a protocol by making essential properties explicit. Communications protocols, which must work over an unreliable medium, have been verified for years. Researchers specify how the medium can go wrong: whether messages can be reordered, duplicated, etc. Similarly, with security protocols we must specify the adversary's capabilities. An active attacker-one who can send messages-is more dangerous than a passive eavesdropper. The former can launch a middle-person attack (Fig. 3) , placing herself between the two parties and typically modifying their messages before forwarding them. While the adversary is often called the "intruder", she could be a corrupt insider, trusted by the others. We must assume the worst possible case. Considering how simple they are, security protocols are surprisingly hard to verify. The main reason is that their goals are informally stated and poorly understood [lo] . Secrecy is an obvious goal, but just as important is authentication: knowing who originated a message. Both properties are necessary in order to be sure that we are talking to the right person. Other security goals might be anonymity or non-repudiation [33] . The security community debates these concepts endlessly and delights in finding flaws in other people's work.
By way of comparison, a floating-point division unit is much more complicated than a security protocol. However, there is a standard specification of what the unit should do. The verifier does not have to consider the risks posed by a hostile environment.
This paper presents a tutorial on security protocols, with the hope of pointing out some pitfalls. It begins (32) by distinguishing long-term keys from session keys and explaining why the latter need to be fresh. It presents two very different protocol flaws in order to illustrate their diversity (33) . Then it introduces my work (the inductive method [23] ), with some notes on its origins in other work (34). To demonstrate the method, the paper describes how the Yahalom protocol is modelled (35) and how simple properties can be proved (36). Secrecy properties are harder to prove, but they are more interesting ($7). The concluding section discusses the general limitations of formal analysis ($8).
Freshness of nonces and keys
Suppose you find a fish in the back of the fridge. You don't know how old it is. It smells all right, and if cooked thoroughly it might be OK to eat-but most of us would prefer to go hungry. Freshness is equally important in security, and some items have a short shelf-life. Most security protocols ultimately rely on long-term keys. Each participant (or their institution) will have one. They are guarded like the Crown Jewels: their loss compro-mises everything derived from them. Setting up these secrets takes considerable effort, including face-to-face contact. Even with public-key cryptography, Monica needs someone trustworthy to deliver her public key to Bill: how can he be sure the key is Monica's?
Since each encrypted message gives another hint to any code-breakers, long-term keys should be used as little as possible. Normally they are used to set up short-term session keys that carry the bulk of the traffic. With public-key systems, the two parties can exchange encrypted random numbers, then scramble them to arrive at a session key. An alternative is to rely on a trusted third party: the uuthentication server.
As their name implies, session keys are used for one session only. They cannot be guarded like the Crown Jewels because there are too many of them: they are generated in great quantities. Moreover, some of them are shared with our adversary or her co-conspirators. Like that fish, we must regard an old session key as potentially compromised.
By replaying past messages, an adversary might deceive Bill into using an old session key. To thwart replay attacks, most protocols use nonces: numbers that are generated to identify protocol runs uniquely. During a run, each party must be able to insert a nonce of their choice. Later, when accepting a session key or other credentials, they will expect to see the same nonce attached to it in a tamper-evident message (one that is protected by a cryptographic integrity check). They conclude that the message is new: it must have been generated more recently than their nonce.
Other protocols use synchronized clocks and timestamps in order to detect the use of old messages. Burrows et al. [6] have abstracted the notion of freshness from such mechanisms. An item isfresh if it has not been used before.
Protocol failure: two examples
We can see these concepts at work in the Otway-Rees protocol, which is designed to let anybody establish a secure connection with anybody else. The protocol assumes a shared-key cryptosystem: every user has a unique longterm key, which they share with s, the authentication server.
Consider this faulty variant of the protocol (Fig. 4) B takes his certificate. He verifies that the nonce i t contains is the same one (Nb) that he sent out in step two. Once satisfied, he forwards the other certificate to A , who will similarly inspect her certificate. If both of them are satisfied, then they will proceed to communicate using Kab as a session key.
A lot of things are going on here, but we might expect this protocol to be correct-especially as it is claimed to be in a landmark paper on protocol verification [6, p. 2471. However, a malicious user C can attack it (Fig. 5) . The attack involves two interleaved runs. It works because the two certificates sent in message 3 have identical formats and because nonce N b is unprotected in message 2 . (The notation CA stands for C masquerading as A . )
Clearly, protocols must be checked by mechanical tools. Attacks of such complexity are hard even for experts to notice. But protocols can fail in other ways. The triangular configuration (Fig. 6 ) is designed to allow both A and B to know that the other party has been active. But the variant shown above is vulnerable: B's certificate { A , Kab)Kh contains no nonce and thus gives no evidence of freshness. Let K be an old session key that had once been shared by A and B . If C has somehow obtained K and has kept the old certificate ( A , K)Kh containing this key, then she can execute a bogus run with B : Now B has accepted an old, compromised session key and regards it as shared with A . As with Otway-Rees, the correct version of the protocol encrypts nonce N b in message 2. But the similarity is superficial: the two attacks could hardly be more different.
Otway-Rees requires N b to be protected from modification. The attack involves interleaved runs and a malicious insider. The victim receives a fresh key, shared unfortunately with the wrong person.
Yahalom requires Nb to be kept secret. The attack is trivial and can be camed out by an outsider. The victim receives a key that was once fit for the purpose but has become compromised.
It is hard to find a verification method that is sensitive to both types of problem, even in such simple protocols as these. The BAN logic of Burrows, Abadi and Needharn [6] was for many years the basis of most research on protocol verification. Freshness reasoning is its main strength: it can analyze Yahalom. But it does not attempt to cover every aspect of correctness; it is silent on matters of secrecy. It finds nothing wrong with the version of OtwayRees given above. Other protocols verified using BAN have since been attacked, for example by Lowe's model checking techniques [ 131.
Model checking is inexpensive and highly effective, but it too has limitations. The state-space explosion forces the model to be kept simple, typically limiting the number of participants and other parameters to one or two. Recently, towe [I51 and Roscoe [27] have made advances on this problem; for some types of protocol, correctness in the general case can be shown by checking a finite model.
An alternative is to rely entirely on proof. The rest of this paper is devoted to my own work: inductive proofs mechanized using the Isabelle system. Other recent work deserves attention: the theory of strand spaces [31] is a promising foundation for proving protocols correct.
An inductive model of security protocols
This section outlines the inductive method [23] . It attempts to suggest principles about how to model a system using mechanical proof tools; towards this end, it describes how the main primitives evolved.
A model must be detailed enough to be useful and simple enough to be usable. If proofs are to be performed by machine, then simplicity becomes even more important. (Mechanical proofs are harder than paper ones, not easier, because even obvious steps must be justified formally.) Also, a model should be easy to explain to other people, especially to sceptical security experts.
When people reason about protocols informally, they often use induction. They argue that each protocol step preserves the desired safety properties. If we model protocols inductively, then the machine proofs will have the same structure as informal ones, which is a major advantage. Note that an inductive definition can be seen as an operational semantics.
Lowe 
Agents and messages
Before we can talk about particular protocols, we must formalize the agent population and the general structure of messages. These are defined in Isabelle [22] essentially as follows (some details are omitted): There are three kinds of agents: the server s (called Server in the text), the friendly agents (which are indexed by natural numbers) and the spy. The spy is an active attacker and is accepted as a valid user. The spy has taken control of an arbitrary set of compromised agents, but the server is always trustworthy.
A message can be the name of an agent, a nonce, a key, a pair of messages, or a message encrypted using a key. The familiar notation { X I , . . . X , -l , X n ] is defined to abbreviate MPair XI . .
. (MPair X , -I X , ) .
The datatype declarations specify types that are free algebras: the constructors are injective and their ranges are mutually disjoint. In particular, we have
This theorem states that a ciphertext can be decrypted using only one key and can yield only one plaintext. Some realworld encryption methods do not fit this black-box model. With RSA for example, multiplication commutes with encryption [25] . Fortunately, most security protocols assume an underlying implementation of strong encryption. It is not clear how to model those that do not.
The function parts
The next step is to define operations on messages. They are needed for expressing assertions and describing the pos- 
The function analz
Two other equations express its relationship with parts and analz. The function analz is intended to model what the adversary can extract from a corpus of messages. The closure properties of the set analz H are defined inductively. The only difference from the definition of parts H is in the rule for Crypt:
This rule states that decryption requires the matching key.
(The inverse of a key is meaningful for public-key cryptosystems; for shared keys, K -' = K.) As with parts, set equalities can be proved by rule induction. Transitivity is again expressed by idempotence:
The close relationship between the two operators is revealed by two further equations:
Again, introducing a map from sets to sets may seem unconventional. Schneider [30] writes H t-X to state that an intruder can derive X from a set H of messages. (Bolignano's known& relation [5] is similar.) This relation already concerns a set of messages, so by analogy with parts we could formalize the set entails H = ( X I H t-X). The set would be both upwards and downwards closed under message construction. But this approach can be simplified.
The relation H t-X comprises two distinct questions:
1. Can X be extracted from H by decrypting ciphertexts with available keys? 2. Can X can be built up from elements of H?
Most of the time we are only interested in question 1, which expresses safety properties. We only care about question 2 when considering what active attacks the intruder could launch. It is better to replace entails H by two separate operators, analz H and synth H.
The function synth
The set synth H captures the "building up" aspect of entailment. Its inductive definition says that it includes all agent names but no nonces or keys other than those in H. Symbolic evaluation is another benefit of separating entails into analz and synth. Proof by induction typically requires symbolic evaluation to reduce an assertion about (X) U H to one about H, where we have an induction hypothesis about H and X is a new message. This is obviously impossible for synth (and entails would be even worse) because infinitely many new messages can be generated from X. However, if X is sufficiently definite then analz((X) U H) can be simplified to a complicated expression built from analz H . The simplifier therefore does a tremendous amount of work that would otherwise have to be done manually, with many case splits.
Traces of events
Still following the CSP approach 113, 301, let us specify the system's behaviour as the set of possible traces of events. A trace model is concrete and easy to explain. An event is an atomic action, one of three forms:
Says A E X occurs when A attempts to send E the message X.
Gets A X occurs when A receives the message X. She cannot be expected to know where it came from. Notes A X occurs when A stores the message X internally. (Here X may be the result of a calculation.) For each Gets event there is a corresponding Says event. G. Bella 121 introduced the Gets event to allow explicit reasoning about agent knowledge. We can do much without it [23] , but it improves the readability of protocol definitions and theorem statements.
Modelling the Yahalom protocol
The Yahalom protocol [6, p. 2571 is a good example for evaluating verification methods. It is short (four messages) but its analysis is difficult. As mentioned above, it demonstrates the importance of freshness: session keys degrade with age. It also involves a particularly tricky treatment of secrecy.
Many authors, including myself, have demonstrated their work on a different example: the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol. Lowe famously found a flaw in this protocol [ 131. However, Yahalom is richer in every way.
Protocol specifications make use of additional functions that operate on a trace eus. Their intuitive meanings are as follows: The functions set, knows and used are defined by list recursion. Figure 7 presents the Isabelle specification of the Yahalom protocol. It defines the correct version, with nonce N b encrypted in message 2. As usual with operational semantics, the rules are quite readable; compare with the informal description given in 3 3 . Full details of the Yahalom proofs appear elsewhere 1211.
The inductive definition of yahalom, which is a set of traces, comprises eight rules. The first three are required in all specifications. There is a rule to allow the empty trace. The Fake rule models an active attacker sending a message built from components taken from past traffic. In detail, he can extend the current trace, eus, with the event Says Spy B X , where X is constructed from previous traffic, knows Spyeus, using the functions synth and analz.
The Reception rule says that if A sends a message to B then B might receive it. (But he might not: the rules do not have to be applied, so there will be traces in which some messages are lost.)
The next four rules are the protocol steps themselves, as they would be performed by honest agents. The function used expresses that agents choose fresh nonces, presumably by generating big random numbers. Also, shrK A is the formal syntax for Ka, the long-term key that A shares with the authentication server.
The last and most interesting rule is Oops, which compromises session keys. Such a rule is necessary; otherwise session keys remain secure forever and the model cannot distinguish the correct version of Yahalom from the bad one presented in 53.
The simplest type of Oops rule states that any session key distributed by the server can reach the spy. Naturally, any security guarantees proved about a key K will require that K has not been lost in this way. With such a model, we can show that a protocol still works even if some session keys are lost. However, that model is not detailed enough to distinguish between these two scenarios: 0 B received a bad session key because it became compromised soon after being issued. 
Simple lemmas about Yahalom
Protocol analyses using the inductive method follow the usual techniques for reasoning about an operational semantics. Lemmas are established, mostly using rule induction, until finally the desired properties are proved. Quite a variety of protocols have been analyzed: using public-key encryption or shared-key encryption (or both), distributing nonces or keys (or both) or even calculating session keys. While there is some variety in the theorems that are proved, there is also much uniformity.
Assertions such as 
Figure 7. Specifying the Yahalom protocol
Here, the constant bud stands for the set of compromised agents, and the definition of knows makes their keys available to the spy. The theorem says that if A is honest then Ku will never form part of any traffic, let alone reach the spy. Unicity lemmas are useful. For example, if the server has sent the two messages {B7 K , NU, Nb)Ku (B', K, NU', Nb']~,t (with the same K each time) then all the corresponding message components agree. This theorem holds because the server never uses a session key twice.
Authenticity theorems are important. A trivial induction shows that if { B , Kab, NU, NblK, appears in traffic then it was sent by the server in message 3 (if A e bad). This simple result assures A that this message came from the server. Because the session key is securely bundled with A's nonce, she knows it to be fresh. Similarly, one can prove inductively that the server sends this message only after receiving a copy of message 2. Continuing in this vein, we can reason backwards from any point in a protocol run.
For Yahalom, B's authenticity theorem is hard to prove. We can easily show that if { A , Kab), appears in traffic (and B bad) then it was sent by the server. But this certificate contains no nonces, so it says nothing about the freshness of Kub. For that we must turn to the second half of mes- this theorem assures B that the session key is fresh. However, the theorem makes a significant assumption: that Nb is kept secret. A crucial step in its proof is that the spy could not have created the message {NbJKUh because he does not know Nb.
Secrecy theorems for Yahalom
For all protocols that involve session keys, we must prove that those keys remain secret. For Yahalom, we must moreover prove that Nb remains secret. We must prove secrecy in the presence of the Oops rule, which compromises some keys and nonces; we must establish bounds on the damage caused by such losses. Secrecy theorems are expressed in terms of analz, the function that returns all that can be decrypted from its argument, and the simplification rules for analz are inconvenient. For all these reasons, secrecy is hard to prove.
The session key secrecy theorem asserts correctness of the protocol from the server's point of view. It is subject to several conditions: If these hypotheses hold, the theorem concludes that the key is safe from the spy:
K @ analz(knows Spy eus).
As mathematicians know, sometimes a lemma can be as interesting as the main result. Proving the theorem above requires such a lemma. The induction presents us with goals of the form
where eu#eus is the current trace extended with eu, the latest event. If that event is an instance of message 3, then it contains another session key K', which is possibly being distributed to a bad agent. So we have to simplify the formula K E analz({K') U knows Spyeus), (1) where both K and K' are session keys. A little thought reveals that the formula ought to be equivalent to
Knowing the extra key K' does not make it any easier to decrypt K from past traffic because the protocol never encrypts session keys using other session keys.
When we try to prove the equivalence between (1) and (2), induction fails. Message 3 is again the culprit; it introduces yet another session key. We have to generalize the induction formula to a set K of session keys:
With this lemma in hand, we can prove the session key secrecy theorem. The lemma is important in its own right because it expresses a robustness principle: the loss of one session key does not compromise others. So I call it the session key compromise theorem. Some protocols do not satisfy this theorem, such as Kerberos IV, where the loss of one session key can compromise any number of other keys. Yet the losses do not cascade; the protocol can be verified [3] .
Yahalom poses similar problems: we must prove secrecy of Nb, but the loss of a session key compromises the corresponding nonce. It was for Yahalom that the necessary technique was first developed [21] . Very briefly, the idea is to formalize the relation between session keys and the items they encrypt. Then use this relation to express the session key compromise theorem in restricted form. If the server has associated Nb' with K in message 3 then Nb E analz((K) U knows Spyeus) Nb E analz(knows Spyevs)
provided Nb # Nb'. In other words, Nb' is the only nonce that could be affected by the loss of K .
Let us review the analysis of Yahalom. Near the end of 36, I outlined the proof that B receives a fresh key. In part, the proof argued that the spy could not have created the message (NbtKuh because he did not know Nb. To prove that Nb was secret required a complicated and lengthy argument.
As an experiment, I have formalized the bad version of Yahalom (Fig. 6 ) without Oops to demonstrate why that rule is needed. In this version, Nb is not secret. But the session key secrecy theorem holds as usual, and with Oops omitted, session keys remain secret for ever. So we can argue that the spy could not have created the message {Nb)Kuh because he did not know Kab. This proof concludes that Kab is a good session key even though it is not fresh. This unrealistic proof is only half as long as the original one and is easy to find: the experiment described in this paragraph took only an hour, starting from the original Yahalom proof script.
Yahalom could be dismissed as a toy; a real-world example is the Internet protocol SSL (Fig. 2) . It has more messages than Yahalom and uses fancier cryptographic primitives, but its design is straightforward. The primitives it needs are easily modelled [24] . A cryptographic hash function is expected to be collision-free, so the model assumes it to be injective. Hashing is expected to be non-invertible in practice, so the model does not equip the spy with the means to invert it. (But we must add a rule to let the spy to perform hashing.) Unlike Yahalom, there is nothing tricky about this protocol; it is hard to analyze simply because it is big and complicated.
Conclusions
Dijkstra has famously remarked [9, p. 61 that testing can show the presence of bugs but never their absence. Program proofs are generally thought to be free of this limitation. But we must abandon this claim as soon as we try to model an unreliable or hostile environment. Our proof has to be based upon a formal model, and a real-world adversary need not conform to our model. At first sight, the inductive approach appears to give a high level of confidence. The protocols analyzed include three of industrial strength:
rn The model of the SSL protocol (actually TLS, its successor) includes some details of the calculation of session keys for both initial runs and resumptions [24] . 0 The analysis of the Recursive Authentication Protocol [23] copes with runs of arbitrary length.
All that may sound wonderful, but Ryan and Schneider found serious flaws in the Recursive Authentication Protocol [29] --or rather in the proposed implementation, which replaced the encryption by exclusive-OR and cryptographic hashing. Once we realize that perfection is not attainable, model checking regains its attraction, especially since Lowe's work [I41 makes it almost cost-free. Security analysts know that any system can be broken, given enough effort. Too many things can go wrong. Suppose that Monica's messages to Bill are always YES or No, encrypted with Bill's public key. After observing the traffic for some time, a spy can probably work out which ciphertext means YES and which means NO. Such deductions lie outside of most models. However complicated our model is, significant details will be left out. Even stray electromagnetic radiation from equipment is a security risk; Wright gives an amusing account in Spycarcher [32, pp. [19] , in which he outlined the history of the BAN logic. BAN'S main contribution, he said, was to express protocol mechanisms in terms of abstractions such as freshness. Abstractions made BAN usable but also made its analysis incomplete. We have considered similar issues above. Adding detail to our model (the Oops rule, for example) allows it to make important distinctions, but the proofs become much harder.
BAN derivations are short and straightforward; they do not require automated support. Model checking establishes properties automatically, and the preliminary formalization needs typically hours or days. Proofs using the inductive method typically require days or weeks of specialist work. When certifying a system, somebody must decide how much confidence is required and balance the cost of verification against that of failure. Often a combination of tools will be used, along with expert scrutiny. Automation can never replace informed judgement.
